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Abstract 
Solar resource in northern Chile is among the highest in the world, and economy pivots around mining industries [1], which have 
an intensive consumption of heat, electricity and water. Electricity supply is strongly based on coal and the common source for 
heat is diesel [2]. While PV can provide electricity at a near competitive price in most markets, CSP is seen as more suitable for 
utility-scale projects, so both technologies are considered for electricity supply. A base case has been defined for each 
technology, with investment, operation, fiscal and financial costs as close as possible to the reality of the solar sector in Chile. 
Five different taxes have been detected to apply to Non-Conventional Renewable Energy (ERNC) projects, such as Customs 
Duty, Value-Added Tax (VAT), Corporate Tax, Municipal Tax and Additional Tax for Expatriated Revenues. The effect of these 
taxes on the final price of electricity required to make the project economically feasible has been determined. Sensitivity to 
exemptions and incentives, both existing and proposed, has been studied, and the efficiency of such measures, in terms of price 
reduction vs. taxes not collected, has been estimated. The Chilean state and/or Multilateral Development Banks can channel aids 
from Clean Technology Funds or Official Development Assistances to incentive solar projects through different products such as 
Soft Loans and Partial Credit Guaranties. The effect of these aids on the final price of electricity required to make the project 
economically feasible has been determined, and sensitivities have been studied. 
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1. Introduction: economic environment and tax structure in northern Chile 
The activities that encompass mining in northern Chile grow an average 5 % annually, and require large volumes 
of electricity, heat and water. In Chile, energy dependence on imported fossil fuel is equal to 68 % of gross primary 
energy consumption. Also, 56.5 % of the electricity generated comes from fossil fuels [3], yet the increase in fossil 
fuel prices, agreements for reducing emissions and requirements in the environmental regulations have fostered a 
push for solar to be the primary energy source for conversion into electrical and thermal energy. These technologies 
offer greater energy independence, price stability and lower emissions. Fiscal and financial incentives can help the 
promoters to reduce the final price of electricity required to make Non-Conventional Renewable Energy (ERNC), 
and particularly solar, projects economically feasible, and contribute to the quick and steady development of said 
projects. 
Regarding the tax structure, five different taxes have been detected to apply to ERNC projects:  
The Customs Duty or “Impuesto al Comercio Exterior” (CE) is an indirect tax levied on imports. The tariff is 
calculated as a 6 % of the result of adding the cost of goods, insurance premium and freight value. Several countries 
have signed bilateral commerce treaties with Chile which include partial or total exemptions from this tax [4]. 
The Value-Added Tax or “Impuesto al Valor Agregado” (IVA) is an indirect tax levied on consumption. 
Companies act as collectors of this tax, balancing the amounts paid and charged on this concept with the 
government. The rate of this tax is 19 % [5]. 
The Corporate Tax or “Impuesto a las Utilidades” (IU) is a direct tax levied on the income earned by commercial, 
industrial, mining and service companies. It is applied on the basis of the net profits earned by the company. The 
rate of this tax is 20 % [5].  
The Municipal Tax or “Impuesto de Patente Comercial” (PC) is a direct tax levied by municipalities on 
companies that develop commercial or industrial activities in their territory. The yearly amount is calculated on the 
basis of the equity capital of the company, and the rate ranges between 0.25 and 0.50 %, at the municipality’s 
discretion [5]. It is limited to 8,000 UTM/year where UTM stands for “Unidad Tributaria Mensual”, a figure in 
Chilean tax law which value changes monthly according to the Consumer Price Index. It has ranged between 40,005 
and 40,286 CLP (Chilean pesos) during the first half of 2013 [6]. 
The Additional Tax or “Impuesto Adicional” (IA) is a direct tax levied on the same basis as the Corporate Tax, 
but it applies to income obtained in Chile by individuals or legal entities neither domiciled nor resident in Chile, 
when this income is sent abroad. The rate of this tax is 35%, but the amounts already paid on the same basis (e.g. 
Corporate Tax) are deducted [5]. 
 
Fig. 1. Chilean tax structure, with taxes applying to ERNC projects highlighted 
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2. Method 
2.1. Definition of a base case 
Typical projects have been defined for large scale, CSP and PV technologies (Table 1). Capacity factors have 
been simulated for a location near Atacama, in the north of Chile, using NREL’s System Advisor Model. 
Investment, O&M (operation and maintenance) costs and erection periods have been estimated according to 
interviews with component suppliers and specialized engineering companies. Financial conditions and structure 
have been chosen as appropriate for a mature and stable solar development scenario, according to previous 
experience of the authors in the Spanish solar market. Both the Internal Rate of Return (IRR) and the Debt-Service 
Coverage Ratio (DSCR) have been fixed, leaving the sales price of energy as the only degree of freedom for the 
analysis. The IRR has been calculated over the cash flow of dividend. Other parameters such as the percent of 
investment subject to CE and VAT, the Depreciation period and the ownership of Chilean investors have been 
defined to complete a base case. An economical model was developed in Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) 
based on a MS Excel spreadsheet. This model considers cash flows both for the project and for the investors, as well 
as accounting balances, taxes payment and debt service. 
Table 1. Type projects for CSP and PV. 
Parameter CSP PV Parameter CSP PV 
Installed power, MW 50 25 Internal Rate of Return, % 12 12 
Capacity factor, % 38.0 16.1 Depreciation period (acc.), years 20 20 
Investment, million USD 250.0 47.9 Analysis period, years 25 25 
O&M costs, thousand USD 4,000 450 Customs Duty (CE) rate, % 6 6 
Erection period, years 2 1 Investment subject to CE, % 30 50 
Financial leverage, % 75 75 Value-Added Tax rate, % 19 19 
Interest rate, % 6 6 Investment subject to VAT, % 100 100 
Payment holiday, years 2 1 Corporate Tax (IU) rate, % 20 20 
Financing structure Project finance Depreciation period (tax), years 20 20 
Debt-Service Coverage Ratio 1.3 1.3 Municipal Tax (PC) rate, % 0.5 0.5 
Debt-Service Reserve, months 6 6 Additional Tax (IA) rate, % 35 35 
Maximum repayment period, years 17 16 Chilean investors’ ownership, % 100 100 
Debt payments per year 2 2    
2.2. Measured parameters 
The sales price required for the project to comply with every restraint was the degree of freedom used in the 
calculations, as it will change whenever a fiscal incentive is applied. The raw outputs of the analysis are the sales 
price itself, the total income of the project and the total taxes paid by the project. From these data, composed indexes 
are calculated: 
x Impact on price (%): variation of the sales price related to the base case for that technology 
x Efficiency: ratio between the variation of the total income of the project and that of the total taxes paid, during a 
25 year period. No discount rate has been considered for these taxes. 
No transaction costs have been considered for the application of the fiscal incentives here described. Thus, those 
incentives for which Efficiency is not clearly above the unit are not considered advisable from an economic point of 
view. Also, incentives for which the Impact on price is not high can have a real efficiency lower than expected. 
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2.3. Sensitivities considered 
In the group of fiscal incentives, the Customs Duty (CE) rate has been varied from 6% (actual rate) to 0% (total 
exemption). The Value Added Tax is neutral for legal entities in Chile. Its effect has been accounted for in the 
financial model as a separate, short-term loan, but no sensitivities were made for this tax.  
The Corporate Tax (IU) has been modified through several mechanisms: Rate variation (± 25%), Tax credits (of 
5, 10, 20 and 100% of the amounts to pay, and during 5, 10 or 25 years (it is, the first 5, 10 or 25 years where the IU 
tax is due)) and Tax deductions: 
x Accelerated depreciation: Chilean tax law [7] allows to depreciate certain goods as if their expected lifetime for 
tax purposes was 1/3 of their expected lifetime. Sensitivities are made from 1 to 20 years depreciation schedule. 
x Bonus depreciation: Chilean tax law [7] includes a bonus depreciation figure which, due to its application 
restrictions, has a negligible effect. Sensitivities are made using a bonus depreciation from 5 to 30%, and without 
the obligation to apply the bonus during the same year of the investment. 
x Consolidated financial statement: unlike other countries [8], Chilean tax law does not allow to consolidate 
financial statements among linked companies. The main effect of this mechanism is that, if a “large company” 
invests in a solar project through a special purpose vehicle (SPV) company, it can apply the surplus tax 
deductions of the solar project to its own taxes due, thus delaying the payment of taxes to ulterior years.  
The Municipal Tax (PC) has been modified through several mechanisms: Rate variation (± 25%), Limit amount 
variation (± 25%) and Tax credits (of 5, 10, 20 and 100% of the amounts to pay, and during 5, 10 or 25 years). The 
Additional Tax for Expatriated Revenues (IA) has been modified Tax exemptions (of 5, 10 and 20% of the taxable 
income, and during 5, 10 or 25 years). A combination of the outstanding mechanisms (in terms of Efficiency) has 
been simulated in order to check for their possible additivity (or lack of it). 
Regarding financial incentives, two mechanisms have been considered: soft loans and partial guaranties. Soft 
loans are concessional credits that typically have interest rates lower than the market, and long repayment periods 
and holidays. These loans might cover all or part of the debt, a range of soft loans has been considered in order to 
assess their impact, using a Monte Carlo analysis. The parameters randomized for the analysis were: the amount of 
debt covered by the soft loan (0 to 100%), the repayment period (20 to 25 years), the payment holiday (2 to 10 
years) and the interest rate (0 to 3%), all of them in a uniform distribution 
 
Fig. 2. Effect of CE rate variation for CSP and PV projects. 
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guaranty has a low credit risk) and also by the borrower. This would reduce the risk premium, reflecting in two main 
aspects: a reduction in the interest rate of the senior loan, and a reduction in the discount rate of the investor. The 
interest rate of the senior loan has been varied from 6 to 4%, and the discount rate of the investor has been varied 
from 12 to 10% 
3. Results and discussion 
3.1. Customs Duty (CE) 
The CE rate has been varied from 6% to 0%. The Impact on price of CE rate variation shown in Fig. 2 is higher 
for PV projects because the investment subject to CE is also larger for PV (50%) than for CSP (30%). The 
Efficiency, on the other hand, remains rather constant near 2.3 for all the CE rates considered, both for PV and CSP.  
3.2. Corporate Tax (IU) 
The IU rate was varied ± 25%. Results are shown in Table 2. The Impact on price of IU rate variation is similar 
for both CSP and PV projects. The Efficiency is below 1 in both cases as well, possibly because the rate variation 
has a more noticeable effect in the latter years of the project, when the taxable profit is larger. 
          Table 2. Effect of IU rate variation for CSP and PV projects. 
IU rate 
CSP PV 
Impact on price Efficiency Impact on price Efficiency 
20% (base case) - - - - 
25% 1.6 % 0.55 1.6 % 0.57 
15% –1.4 % 0.54 –1.4 % 0.54 
 
The effect of possible IU tax credits was assessed, for 5, 20 and 100% of the amounts to pay, and during 5, 10 or 
25 years. The Impact on price of IU tax credits shown in Table 3 is similar for both CSP and PV projects. The case 
where the tax credit is 100% during 25 years is a de facto total IU exemption; it shows that IU is responsible for 
approximately 5% of the final energy price. The Efficiency is above 1 for small credits and durations, and it is 
reduced when any of those parameters increases.  
          Table 3. Effect of IU tax credits for CSP and PV projects. 
Credit Duration (years) 
CSP PV 
Impact on price Efficiency Impact on price Efficiency 
5% 
5 –0.1 % 2.36 –0.1 % 2.15 
10 –0.2 % 1.96 –0.2 % 1.90 
25 –0.5 % 0.91 –0.6 % 0.95 
20% 
5 –0.3 % 2.27 –0.3 % 2.31 
10 –0.8 % 1.79 –0.8 % 1.81 
25 –1.9 % 0.85 –2.0 % 0.88 
100% 
5 –0.8 % 1.73 –0.8 % 1.79 
10 –2.1 % 1.26 –2.1 % 1.28 
25 –4.9 % 0.51 –5.0 % 0.52 
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The Impact on price of a possible bonus depreciation shown in Table 4 is similar for both CSP and PV projects. 
The Efficiency is above 1 for small bonuses, and it is reduced when the bonus increases, possibly because larger 
bonuses have a more noticeable effect in the latter years of the project. 
          Table 4. Effect of bonus depreciation for CSP and PV projects. 
Bonus 
depreciation 
CSP PV 
Impact on price Efficiency Impact on price Efficiency 
5% –2.2 % 1.32 –2.2 % 1.32 
15% –3.8 % 0.83 –3.8 % 0.83 
25% –4.5 % 0.63 –4.5 % 0.63 
 
The Impact on price of accelerated depreciation is shown in Fig. 3. It is similar for both CSP and PV projects. 
The Efficiency is above 5, as its main effect is to reduce the tax burden during the first years of the project. Both 
Impact and Efficiency grow as the depreciation period is reduced until reaching 12 years, from then on the results 
stay flat. This happens because, for depreciation periods below 12 years, the deduction due to depreciation is higher 
than the taxable profit and is accumulated for ulterior years; as a result the IU tax is not due until the 13th year of the 
project. 
 
 
Fig. 3. Effect of accelerated depreciation for CSP and PV projects. 
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        Table 5. Effect of PC rate variation for CSP and PV projects. 
PC rate 
CSP PV 
Impact on price Efficiency Impact on price Efficiency 
0.5% (base case) - - - - 
0.625% 0.3 % 1.20 0.3 % 1.20 
0.375% –0.3 % 1.29 –0.3 % 1.19 
 
The effect of possible PC tax credits was assessed, for 5, 10, 20 and 100% of the amounts to pay, and during 5, 
10 or 25 years. The Impact on price of PC tax credits shown in Table 6 is similar for both CSP and PV projects. The 
case where the tax credit is 100% during 25 years is a de facto total PC exemption; it shows that PC is responsible 
for approximately 1% of the final energy price. The Efficiency is above 1 for all credits and durations, and it is 
reduced when duration increases.  
          Table 6. Effect of PC tax credits for CSP and PV projects. 
Credit Duration (years) 
CSP PV 
Impact on price Efficiency Impact on price Efficiency 
5% 
5 –0.1 % 5.52 –0.1 % 5.88 
25 –0.1 % 1.52 –0.1 % 1.29 
20% 
5 –0.2 % 5.92 –0.2 % 6.17 
25 –0.2 % 1.29 –0.2 % 1.17 
100% 
5 –1.0 % 6.07 –1.1 % 6.07 
25 –1.0 % 1.22 –1.1 % 1.22 
3.4. Additional Tax for Expatriated Revenues (IA) 
For potential non-resident investors, the business scenario is equivalent to having an IU rate of 35 %. This causes 
an increase in the base price required for the project to be attractive, as shown in Table 7. 
Table 7. Effect of IA in the base price required for CSP and PV projects to be attractive. 
IA rate 
CSP PV 
Impact on price Tax collection Impact on price Tax collection 
35% (base case) 7.9 % 31.0 % 8.2 % 30.1 % 
 
The effect of possible tax exemptions was assessed, for 5, 10 and 20% of the taxable income, and during 5, 10 or 
25 years. The Impact on price of IA tax exemptions shown in Table 8 is similar for both CSP and PV projects. The 
Efficiency is above 1 for small exemptions and durations, and it is reduced when any of those parameters increases.  
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Table 8. Effect of IA tax exemptions for CSP and PV projects. 
Exemption Duration (years) 
CSP PV 
Impact on price Efficiency Impact on price Efficiency 
5% 
5 –1.0 % 1.38 –1.0 % 1.44 
10 –1.7 % 1.23 –1.7 % 1.26 
25 –2.5 % 0.82 –2.4 % 0.84 
10% 
5 –2.0 % 1.39 –2.0 % 1.43 
10 –3.3 % 1.22 –3.2 % 1.24 
25 –4.7 % 0.81 –4.7 % 0.84 
20% 
5 –3.5 % 1.31 –3.5 % 1.34 
10 –5.6 % 1.13 –5.6 % 1.17 
25 –8.2 % 0.75 –8.2 % 0.78 
3.5. Combined fiscal incentives 
The outstanding mechanisms (in terms of Efficiency or, when Efficiency was similar, Impact on price) have been 
combined in order to check for their possible additivity (or lack of it). The results in Table 9 show that the Impact on 
price of the individual mechanisms is nearly additive while the Efficiency remains above 1. 
        Table 9. Combination of proposed mechanisms affecting different taxes, for CSP and PV projects. 
  
CSP PV 
Impact on price Efficiency Impact on price Efficiency 
CE: 0% rate –1.6 % 2.28 –2.7 % 2.29 
IU: 7 years depreciation –1.7 % 5.59 –1.7 % 5.75 
PC: 100% credit, 5 years –1.0 % 6.07 –1.1 % 6.07 
Combined mechanism -4.2 % 3.70 -5.5 % 3.30 
 
The combination of accelerated depreciation with the other proposed mechanisms was tested, but they were 
found to lose both Impact on price and Efficiency as their effect now happened in the latter years of the project. 
The option to consolidate financial statements would also affect the results of the mechanisms shown in 4.2; 
several mechanisms have been chosen to illustrate the effect. The Impact on price of the proposed mechanisms is 
increased, as shown in Table 10. It is similar for both CSP and PV projects, and it can reach values higher than the 
hypothetical maximum for IU mechanisms (which was around 5 %, as seen in Table 3). This happens because, when 
consolidate financial statements apply, the years where tax deductions and exemptions would exceed the taxable 
income, this excess is compensated with the taxes due by the “large company”; as a result, the excess deduction 
behaves like an additional income from the point of view of the investor, thus improving the business scenario. 
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        Table 10. Effect of IU proposed mechanisms in a scenario of consolidate financial statements for CSP and PV projects. 
  
CSP PV 
Impact on price Efficiency Impact on price Efficiency 
Exemption (5 years)     
 5% –0.4 % 2.05 –0.4 % 2.05 
20% –1.6 % 2.05 –1.6 % 2.05 
Bonus depreciation     
 
5% –4.8 % 2.35 –5.2 % 2.35 
20% –19.2 % 2.35 –20.8 % 2.35 
Accelerated depreciation (years)     
 
15 –1.5 % 5.88 –1.6 % 5.88 
5 –6.3 % 5.88 –6.8 % 5.88 
 
The Efficiency is above 1 for the cases shown in Table 10, and it remains constant when the deductions and 
exemptions increase, possibly because they have effect in the first years of the project as the “large company” is 
considered to have unlimited capacity to compensate tax deductions.  
  
Fig. 4. Impact on price of the obtainment of a soft loan (a) and of the repayment period (b), for CSP. 
3.6. Financial incentives: soft loan 
The effect of a soft loan is similar for CSP and PV, the amount of debt covered by the soft loan is the only of the 
studied parameters with a clear correlation with the Impact on price. The share of total debt covered by a soft loan 
was varied from 0 to 100 %, and the repayment period of the soft loan was varied from 20 to 25 years. Results are 
shown in Fig. 4a and 4b. The payment holiday of the soft loan was varied from 2 to 10 years, and the interest rate of 
the soft loan was varied from 0 to 3 %. Results are shown in Fig. 5a and 5b. 
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Fig. 5. Impact on price of the payment holiday of a soft loan (a) and of the interest rate (b), for CSP. 
3.7. Financial incentives: partial guaranties 
In order to reflect the reduced risk perceived by the lender and the borrower, the interest rate of the senior loan 
has been modified from 6 to 4%, and the discount rate of the investor and, therefore, the Internal Rate of Return, has 
been modified from 12 to 10%. As shown in Fig. 6, a reduced risk premium has a clear impact on price both for CSP 
and PV projects, especially when applied to the investor’s discount rate.  
 
Fig. 6. Impact on price of the risk reduction due to partial guaranties, for CSP and PV. 
4. Conclusions 
The application of fiscal and financial incentives can lead to a price reduction in the electricity from solar sources 
such as CSP and PV. Fiscal incentives can be assessed in terms of efficiency, where incentives with high efficiency 
would be more advisable from an economic point of view. However, as no transaction costs have been considered 
for the application of the fiscal incentives here described, those for which the Impact on price is not high can have a 
real efficiency noticeably lower than expected. The mechanism with which an incentive is applied can affect its 
efficiency. As a rule of thumb, mechanisms that improve the investor’s cash flows during the earlier years of the 
project reach the best efficiencies for a given impact on price. 
The effect of taxes in the price of electricity in Chile is similar for both CSP and PV, except in the case of 
Customs Duty (CE) due to the different share of imported components. 
Although the reduction of Corporate Tax (IU) could reach an impact on price near –5%, the efficiency of most 
incentives focused on IU drops quickly when impacts on price above –1% are obtained. Accelerated depreciation, a 
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figure already existing in Chilean tax law, is the exception: it achieves a noticeable impact on price with an 
outstanding efficiency both for CSP and PV. A scenario of consolidate financial statements, where a “large 
company” is the investor of the project and benefits from the excess deduction during the first years, would greatly 
improve the effect of the incentives. This mechanism would also make possible the use of tax equity financing 
structures. However, this scenario would affect the whole Chilean economy and its effect should be assessed from a 
holistic perspective. 
Incentives focused on Municipal Tax (PC) show high efficiencies, especially tax credits, and they reach their full 
impact on price during the first five years of the project.  
It is possible to simultaneously apply incentives affecting CE, IU and PC. The combination of CE exemption, 
accelerated depreciation and a 100% tax credit on PC during five years was simulated; their impacts on price are 
additive, and the efficiency of the combined effect is above 3.3 both for CSP and PV. 
The Additional Tax for Expatriated Revenues (IA) can pose an entry barrier for potential non-resident investors. 
Solar projects would require prices approximately an 8% higher to equal the return for the investor. It has the 
additional drawback of cancelling the effect of any incentive focused on IU, as the IA is levied on the same basis as 
the IU but the amounts paid on the same basis are deducted.  
Among financial incentives, the effect of receiving a soft loan was assessed using a Monte Carlo analysis. The 
amount of debt covered by the soft loan is the only parameter with a clear correlation with the impact on price 
within the range studied. The “partial credit guaranties” mechanism is expected to reduce the risk perceived by the 
lender (as the issuer of the guaranty has a low credit risk) and also by the borrower, thus reducing the risk premium 
both in the interest rate of the senior loan and in the discount rate of the investor. The impact on price of reducing 
the interest rate or the discount rate is higher than any of the other incentives studied except for the soft loan. 
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